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ABSTRACT
Facebook pages offer an easy way to reach out to a very large audi-
ence as they can easily be promoted using Facebook’s advertising
platform. Recently, the number of likes of a Facebook page has
become a measure of its popularity and profitability, and an under-
ground market of services boosting page likes, aka like farms, has
emerged. Some reports have suggested that like farms use a net-
work of profiles that also like other pages to elude fraud protection
algorithms, however, to the best of our knowledge, there has been
no systematic analysis of Facebook pages’ promotion methods.
This paper presents a comparative measurement study of page
likes garnered via Facebook ads and by a few like farms. We de-
ploy a set of honeypot pages, promote them using both methods,
and analyze garnered likes based on likers’ demographic, temporal,
and social characteristics. We highlight a few interesting findings,
including that some farms seem to be operated by bots and do not
really try to hide the nature of their operations, while others follow
a stealthier approach, mimicking regular users’ behavior.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook have become
one of the primary outlets for businesses and enterprises to adver-
tise and communicate with their customers. Just in 2013, Face-
book’s net ad revenue amounted to $6.7B, i.e., 5.64% of the global
market [12]. One feature offered by Facebook is the concept of
pages, which business can create, e.g., to display information about
products and events. Users can like them to receive updates, post
messages, or connect with other customers. Page likes also become
part of the user’s profile. The number of likes for a given page is
often considered a measure of its popularity: ChompOn estimates
the expected revenue from each like to be $8, while other estimates
range between $3.60, $136.38, and $214.81 [6].
To reach out to their potential audience, businesses can promote
their Facebook page using targeted ads, via page like ads. Based on
the advertiser’s preferences, ads can be targeted to users from a spe-
cific age or location group, or to users who have certain interests.
As per Facebook’s guidelines, this is the only legitimate way to col-
lect page likes [13]. However, a growing underground industry has
emerged that provides paid services, aka like farms, to inflate the
number of Facebook page likes. Some recent press articles [3, 7,
14, 18] have started to look into Facebook page promotion meth-
ods and speculated that like farms use fake profiles trying to imitate
real users’ behavior. As these likes – which we call fake likes – do
not correspond to a genuine interest in the advertised page, they
are less valuable to businesses in terms of potential customer en-
gagement and revenue. Other reports [19, 20, 22] have suggested
that promoting pages using legitimate Facebook ad campaigns may
also garner significant amounts of fake likes. One possible explana-
tion is that fake profiles attempt to diversify their liking activities to
avoid Facebook’s fraud detection algorithms. To do so, they need
to click on ads and like pages other than those they are paid for.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no system-
atic analysis of Facebook pages’ promotion methods, even though
the understanding of fake likes is arguably crucial to improve algo-
rithms for fraud detection/mitigation in OSNs.
In this paper, we start addressing this gap with a comparative
measurement study of Facebook likes garnered by means of legiti-
mate Facebook page like ads and by using a few underground like
farms. We set up thirteen Facebook honeypot pages and promote
them using both methods. We monitor the likes garnered by these
pages, collect information about the likers (e.g., gender, age, loca-
tion, friend list, etc.), and perform a comparative analysis based on
demographic, temporal, and social characteristics of the likers.
Our study highlights a few interesting findings. When targeting
Facebook users worldwide, we obtain likes from only a few coun-
tries. Likers’ profiles also seem to be skewed toward male pro-
files. We found evidence that different like farms (with different
pricing schemes) garner likes from a similar set of users and may
be managed by the same operator. We also identified two main
modi operandi of the like farms. Our results suggest that a first
set of farms is operated by bots and do not really try to hide the
nature of their operations, delivering likes in bursts and forming
disconnected social sub-graphs. Other farms follow a stealthier ap-
proach, mimicking regular users’ behavior, and rely on a large and
well-connected network structure to gradually deliver likes while
keeping a small count of likes per user. The first strategy reflects a
“quick and dirty” approach where likes from disposable fake users
(as also indicated by the number of terminated accounts) are deliv-
ered rapidly, as opposed to the second one, which exhibits a stealth-
ier approach that leverages the underlying social graph, where real
users (or well-masked fake users) trickle their likes.
We did not find direct evidence that the likes garnered by the
Facebook campaigns also originate from like farms. However,
when comparing profiles attracted by the Facebook campaigns to
those associated with like farms, we did identify a noticeable over-
lap in the pages they liked overall. We also observed that likers
from Facebook campaigns liked a lot more pages than typical Face-
book users, and much closer to that observed for like farm users.
2. RELATEDWORK
Prior work has studied and detected sybil and/or fake OSN ac-
counts by relying on tightly-knit community structures [5, 10, 28,
29, 30]. Findings revealed by our work also highlight several char-
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acteristics about the social structure and activity of fake profiles
attracted by the honeypot pages, e.g., their interconnected nature
or the activity bursts. In fact, our analysis does not only confirm a
few insights used by sybil detection algorithms but also reveals new
patterns that could complement them. A few passive measurement
studies have also focused on characterizing fake user accounts and
their activity. Nazir et al. [21] studied phantom profiles in Face-
book gaming applications, while Thomas et al. [25] analyzed over
1.1 million accounts suspended by Twitter. Gao et al. [15] stud-
ied spam campaigns on Facebook originating from approximately
57,000 user accounts. Yang et al. [27] performed an empirical anal-
ysis of social relationships between spam accounts on Twitter, and
Dave et al. [11] proposed a methodology to measure and finger-
print click-spam in ad networks. Our work differs from these stud-
ies as they all conduct passive measurements, whereas we rely on
the deployment of several honeypot pages and (paid) campaigns to
actively engage with fake profiles.
Stringhini et al. [23] and Lee et al. [17] created honeypot pro-
files in Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter to detect spammers. Their
work differs from ours in that (1) their honeypot profiles were de-
signed to look legitimate, while our honeypot pages explicitly in-
dicated they were not “real” (to deflect real profiles), and (2) our
honeypot pages actively attracted fake profiles by means of paid
campaigns, as opposed to passive honeypot profiles. Also, Thomas
et al. [26] analyzed trafficking of fake accounts in Twitter. They
bought fake profiles from 27 merchants and developed a classi-
fier to detect these fake accounts. In a similar study, Stringhini et
al. [24] analyzed the market of Twitter followers, which, akin to
Facebook like farms, provide Twitter followers for sale. Note that
Twitter follower markets differ from Facebook like farms as Twitter
entails a follower-followee relationship among users, while Face-
book friendships imply a bidirectional relationships. Also, there is
no equivalent of liking a Facebook page in the Twitter ecosystem.
Beutel et al. [4] proposed a technique to detect fake likes based
on identifying groups of users who liked a set of pages within
a given time period. However, their technique does not rely on
ground truth data, so it is unclear whether or not the detection
mechanism blocks all fake likes, or actually only those exhibiting
a certain pattern. By contrast, we focus on actively measuring like
fraud activities by means of honeypots, i.e., attracting fake likes to
empty pages, through payment. We elicit and study ground truth
data, and highlight how some like farms actually try to emulate be-
havior of regular users and thereby stay below the detection radar.
Nonetheless, our work serves as the starting point for improved
fake like detection and can complement techniques from [4].
Finally, a few investigative press reports [3, 7, 14, 20] have also
looked into Facebook page ads and underground like farms, how-
ever, without any systematic analysis of Facebook pages’ promo-
tion methods.
3. METHODOLOGY
This section presents the methodology used to deploy and moni-
tor Facebook honeypot pages and to promote them using both Face-
book page like ads and like farms.
Honeypot Pages. We created 13 Facebook pages called “Virtual
Electricity” and intentionally kept them empty (i.e., no posts or
pictures). Their description included: “This is not a real page,
so please do not like it.” 5 pages were promoted using legitimate
Facebook (FB) ad campaigns targeting users, respectively, in USA,
France, India, Egypt, and worldwide. The remaining 8 pages were
promoted using 4 popular like farms BoostLikes.com (BL), Social-
Formula.com (SF), AuthenticLikes.com (AL), and MammothSo-
cials.com (MS), targeting worldwide or USA users.
In Table 1, we provide details of the honeypot pages, along with
the corresponding ad campaigns. All campaigns were launched on
March 12, 2014, using a different administrator account (owner) for
each page. Each Facebook campaign was budgeted at a maximum
of $6/day to a total of $90 for 15 days. The price for buying likes
varied across likes farms: BoostLikes charged the highest price for
“100% real likes” ($70 and $190 for 1000 likes in 15 days from,
respectively, worldwide and USA). Other like farms also claimed
to deliver likes from “genuine”, “real”, and “active” profiles, but
promised to deliver them in fewer days. Overall, the price of 1000
likes varied between $14.99–$70 for worldwide users and $59.95–
$190 for USA users.
Data Collection. We monitored the “liking” activity on the honey-
pot pages by crawling them, using Selenium web driver [2], every
2 hours to check for new likes. At the end of the campaigns, we
reduced the monitoring frequency to once a day, and stopped mon-
itoring when a page did not receive a like for more than a week. We
used Facebook’s reports tool for page administrators, which pro-
vides a variety of aggregated statistics about attributes and profiles
of page likers. Facebook also provides these statistics for the global
Facebook population. Since a majority of Facebook users do not set
the visibility of their age and location to public [8], we used these
reports to collect statistics about likers’ gender, age, country, home
and current town.1 Later, in Section 4, we will use these statistics
to compare distributions of our honeypot pages’ likers to that of the
overall Facebook population. We also crawled public information
from the likers’ profiles, obtaining the lists of liked pages as well
as friend lists, which are not provided in the reports. Overall, we
identified more than 6.3 millions total likes by users who liked our
honeypot pages and more than 1 million friendship relations.
We acknowledge that our limited budget allows us to only mon-
itor 13 honeypots for a few weeks. Note, however, that our work
is a first-of-a-kind, exploratory study of like fraud practices – as it
will become clear in the rest of the paper, our methodology actually
allows us to derive several interest findings (which could be further
explored, in future work, with larger/more diverse campaigns).
Campaign Summary. In Table 1, we report the total number of
likes garnered by each campaign, along with the number of days
we monitored the honeypot pages. Note that the BL-ALL and MS-
ALL campaigns remained inactive, i.e., they did not result in any
likes even though we were charged in advance. We tried to reach the
like farm admins several times but received no response. Overall,
we collected a total of 6,292 likes (4,523 from like farms and 1,769
from Facebook ads). The largest number of likes were garnered by
AL-USA, the lowest (excluding inactive campaigns) by FB-USA.
Ethics Considerations. Although we only collected openly avail-
able data, we did collect (public) profile information from our hon-
eypot pages’ likers, e.g., friend lists and page likes. We could not
request consent but enforced a few mechanisms to protect user pri-
vacy: all data were encrypted at rest and not re-distributed, and no
personal information was extracted, i.e., we only analyzed aggre-
gated statistics. We are also aware that paying farms to generate
fake likes might raise ethical concerns, however, this was crucial
to create the honeypots and observe the like farms’ behavior. We
believe that the study will help, in turn, to understand and counter
these activities. Also note that the amount of money each farm re-
1As stated in [1], Facebook uses public and private attributes to
provide aggregated statistics about users who clicked on page like
ads, e.g., current location is determined based on IP address.
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Campaign ID Provider Description Location Budget Duration Monitoring #Likes #Terminated
FB-USA Facebook.com Page like ads USA $6/day 15 days 22 days 32 0
FB-FRA Facebook.com Page like ads France $6/day 15 days 22 days 44 0
FB-IND Facebook.com Page like ads India $6/day 15 days 22 days 518 2
FB-EGY Facebook.com Page like ads Egypt $6/day 15 days 22 days 691 6
FB-ALL Facebook.com Page like ads Worldwide $6/day 15 days 22 days 484 3
BL-ALL BoostLikes.com 1000 likes Worldwide $70.00 15 days - - -
BL-USA BoostLikes.com 1000 likes USA only $190.00 15 days 22 days 621 1
SF-ALL SocialFormula.com 1000 likes Worldwide $14.99 3 days 10 days 984 11
SF-USA SocialFormula.com 1000 likes USA $69.99 3 days 10 days 738 9
AL-ALL AuthenticLikes.com 1000 likes Worldwide $49.95 3-5 days 12 days 755 8
AL-USA AuthenticLikes.com 1000 likes USA $59.95 3-5 days 22 days 1038 36
MS-ALL MammothSocials.com 1000 likes Worldwide $20.00 - - - -
MS-USA MammothSocials.com 1000 likes USA only $95.00 - 12 days 317 9
Table 1: Facebook and like farm campaigns used to promote our Facebook honeypot pages.
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Figure 1: Geolocation of the likers (per campaign).
ceived was small ($190 at most) and that this research was reviewed
and approved by the NICTA legal team.
4. ANALYSIS
We now compare the characteristics of the likes garnered by the
honeypot pages promoted via legitimate Facebook campaigns and
those obtained via like farms.
4.1 Location and Demographics Analysis
Location. For each campaign, we looked at the distribution of lik-
ers’ countries: as shown in Figure 1, for the first four Facebook
campaigns (FB-USA, FB-FRA, FB-IND, FB-EGY), we mainly re-
ceived likes from the targeted country (87–99.8%), even though
FB-USA and FB-FRA generated a number of likes much smaller
than any other campaign. When we targeted Facebook users world-
wide (FB-ALL), we almost exclusively received likes from India
(96%). Looking at the like farms, most likers from SocialFormula
were based in Turkey, regardless of whether we requested a US-
only campaign. The other three farms delivered likes complying
to our requests, e.g., for US-only campaigns, the pages received a
majority of likes from US profiles.
Other Demographics. In Table 2, we show the distribution of lik-
ers’ gender and age, and also compare them to the global Facebook
network (last row). The last column reports the KL-divergence be-
tween the age distribution of the campaign users and that of the
entire Facebook population, highlighting large divergence for FB-
IND, FB-EGY, and FB-ALL, which are biased toward younger
users. These three campaigns also appear to be skewed toward male
Campaign Gender Age Distribution (%)
ID % F/M 13-17 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ KL
FB-USA 54/46 54.0 27.0 6.8 6.8 1.4 4.1 0.45
FB-FR 46/54 60.8 20.8 8.7 2.6 5.2 1.7 0.54
FB-IND 7/93 52.7 43.5 2.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.12
FB-EGY 18/82 54.6 34.4 6.4 2.9 0.8 0.8 0.64
FB-ALL 6/94 51.3 44.4 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.6 1.04
BL-USA 53/47 34.2 54.5 8.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.60
SF-ALL 37/63 19.8 33.3 21.0 15.2 7.2 2.8 0.04
SF-USA 37/63 22.3 34.6 22.9 11.6 5.4 2.9 0.04
AL-ALL 42/58 15.8 52.8 13.4 9.7 5.2 3.0 0.12
AL-USA 31/68 7.2 41.0 35.0 10.0 3.5 2.8 0.09
MS-USA 26/74 8.6 46.9 34.5 6.4 1.9 1.4 0.17
Facebook 46/54 14.9 32.3 26.6 13.2 7.2 5.9 –
Table 2: Gender and age statistics of likers.
profiles. In contrast, the demographics of likers from SocialFor-
mula and, to a lesser extent, AuhtenticLikes and MammothSocials,
are much more similar to those of the entire network, even though
male users are still over-represented.
4.2 Temporal Analysis
We also analyzed temporal patterns observed for each of the
campaigns. In Figure 2, we plot the cumulative number of likes
observed on each honeypot page over our observation period (15
days). We observe from Figure 2(b) that all the like farm cam-
paigns, except BoostLikes, exhibit a very similar trend with a few
bursts of a large number of likes. Specifically, for the SocialFor-
mula, AuthenticLikes, and MammothSocials campaigns, likes were
garnered within a short period of time of two hours. With Authen-
ticLikes, we observed likes from more than 700 profiles within the
first 4 hours of the second day of data collection. Interestingly, no
more likes were observed later on. On the contrary, the BoostLikes
campaign targeting US users shows a different temporal behavior:
the trend is actually comparable to that observed in the Facebook
Ads campaigns (see Figure 2(a)). The number of likes steadily in-
creases during the observation period and no abrupt changes are
observed.
This suggests that two different strategies may be adopted by like
farms. On the one hand, the abrupt increase in the cumulative num-
ber of likes happening during a short period of time might likely be
due to automated scripts operating a set of fake profiles. These pro-
files are instrumented to satisfy the number of likes as per the cus-
tomer’s request. On the other hand, BoostLikes’s strategy, which
resembles the temporal evolution in Facebook campaigns, seems
to rely on the underlying social graph, possibly constituted by fake
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Figure 2: Time series of cumulative number of likes for Facebook and like farms campaigns.
Provider # Likers # Likers with Avg (± Std) Median # Friendships # 2-Hop Friendship
Public Friend Lists #Friends #Friends Between Likers Relations Between Likers
Facebook.com 1448 261 (18.0%) 315± 454 198 6 169
BoostLikes.com 621 161 (25.9%) 1171± 1096 850 540 2987
SocialFormula.com 1644 954 (58.0%) 246± 330 155 50 1132
AuthenticLikes.com 1597 680 (42.6%) 719± 973 343 64 1174
MammothSocials.com 121 62 (51.2%) 250± 585 68 4 129
ALMS 213 101 (47.4%) 426± 961 46 27 229
Table 3: Likers and friendships between likers.
profiles operated by humans. Results presented in the next section
corroborate the existence of these two strategies.
4.3 Social Graph Analysis
Next, we evaluated the social graph induced by the likers’ pro-
files. To this end, we associated each user with one of the like farm
services based on the page they liked. Note that a few users liked
pages in multiple campaigns, as we will discuss in Section 4.4. A
significant fraction of users actually liked pages corresponding to
both the AuthenticLikes and the MammothSocials campaigns (see
Figure 4): we put these users into a separate group, labelled as
ALMS. Table 3 summarizes the number of likers associated with
each service, as well as additional details about their friendship net-
works. Note that the number of likers reported for each campaign
in Table 3 is different from the number of campaign likes (Table 1),
since some users liked more than one page.
Many likers kept their friend lists private: this occurred for al-
most 80% of likers in the Facebook campaigns, about 75% in the
BoostLikes campaign, and much less frequently for the other like
farm campaigns (∼40–60%). The number and percentage of users
with public friend lists are reported in Table 3. The fourth column
reports the average number of friends (± the standard deviation)
for profiles with visible friend lists, and the fifth column reports the
median. Some friendship relations may be hidden, e.g., if a friend
chose to be invisible in friend lists, thus, these numbers only rep-
resent a lower bound. The average number of friends of users as-
sociated with the BoostLikes campaign (and to a smaller extent,
the AuthenticLikes campaign) was much higher than the average
number of friends observed elsewhere.
To evaluate the social ties between likers, we looked at friendship
relations between likers (either originating from the same campaign
provider or not), ignoring friendship relations with Facebook users
who did not like any of our pages. Table 3 (sixth column) reports,
for each provider, the overall number of friendship relationships
between likers that involved users associated with the provider.
In Figure 3(a), we plot the social graph induced by such friend-
ship relations (likers who did not have friendship relations with any
other likers were excluded from the graph). Based on the resulting
social structure, we suggest that:
1. Dense relations between likers from BoostLikes point to
an interconnected network of real users, or fake users who
mimic complex ties to pose as real users;
2. The pairs (and occasionally triplets) that characterize Social-
Formula likers might indicate a different strategy of con-
structing fake networks, mitigating the risk that identification
of a user as fake would consequently bring down the whole
connected network of fake users; and
3. The friendship relations between AuthenticLikes and Mam-
mothSocials likers might indicate that the same operator
manages both services.
We also considered indirect links between likers, through mutual
friends. Table 3 reports the overall number of 2-hop relationships
between likers from the associated provider. Figure 3(b) plots the
relations between likers who either have a direct relation or a mu-
tual friend, clearly pointing to the presence of relations between
likers from the same provider. These tight connections, along with
the number of their friends, suggest that we only see a small part
of these networks. (In fact, like farms sell packages of as many
as 50k likes.) For SocialFormula, AuthenticLikes, and Mammoth-
Socials, we also observe many isolated pairs and triplets of likers
who are not connected. One possible explanation is that farm users
create fake Facebook accounts and keep them separate from their
personal accounts and friends. In contrast, the BoostLikes network
is well-connected.
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Figure 3: Friendship relations between likers of different campaigns.
4.4 Page Like Analysis
We then looked at the other pages liked by profiles attracted to
our honeypot pages. In Figure 4(a) and 4(b), respectively, we plot
the distribution of the number of page likes for Facebook ads’ and
like farm campaigns’ users. To draw a baseline comparison, we also
collected page like counts from a random set of 2000 Facebook
users, extracted from an unbiased sample of Facebook user pop-
ulation. The original sample was crawled for another project [9],
obtained by randomly sampling Facebook public directory which
lists all the IDs of searchable profiles.
We observed a large variance in the number of pages liked, rang-
ing from 1 to 10,000. The median page like count ranged between
600 and 1000 for users from the Facebook campaigns and between
1200 and 1800 for those from like farm campaigns, with the ex-
ception of the BL-USA campaign (median was 63). In contrast, the
median page like count for our baseline Facebook user sample was
34. The page like counts of our baseline sample mirrored numbers
reported in prior work, e.g., according to [16], the average number
of pages liked by Facebook users amounts to roughly 40. In other
words, our honeypot pages attracted users that tend to like signifi-
cantly more pages than regular Facebook users. Since our honeypot
pages both for Facebook and like farm campaigns explicitly indi-
cated they were not “real”, we argue that a vast majority of the
garnered likes are fake. We argue that these users like a large num-
ber of pages because they are probably reused for multiple “jobs”
and also like “normal” pages to mimic real users.2
To confirm our hypothesis, for each pair of campaigns, we plot
their Jaccard similarity. Specifically, let Sk denote the set of pages
liked by a user k: the Jaccard similarity between the set of likes
by likers of two campaigns A and B, which we plot in Fig-
ure 5(a), is defined as |A ∩ B|/|A ∪ B|, where A = ⋃∀i∈A Si
and B =
⋃
∀j∈B Sj . We also plot, in Figure 5(b), the similarity
between A′ =
⋃
∀i∈A i and B
′ =
⋃
∀j∈B j, i.e., the similarity
between the set of likers of the different campaigns.
Note from Figure 5 that FB-IND, FB-EGY, and FB-ALL have
relatively large (Jaccard) similarity with each other. In addition, the
2Facebook does not impose any limit on the maximum number of
page likes per user.
SF-USA and SF-ALL pair and the AL-USA and MS-USA pair also
have relatively large Jaccard similarity. These findings suggest that
the same fake profiles are used in multiple campaigns by a like farm
(e.g., SF-ALL and SF-USA). Moreover, some fake profiles seem to
be shared by different like farms (e.g., AL-USA and MS-USA),
suggesting that they are run by the same operator.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented a comparative measurement study of Face-
book page promotion methods, aiming to shed light on like farms’
activities. We identified two main modi operandi: (1) some farms,
like SocialFormula and AuthenticLikes, seem to be operated by
bots and do not really try to hide the nature of their operations,
as demonstrated by large bursts of likes and the limited number of
friends per profile; (2) other farms, like BoostLikes, follow a much
stealthier approach, aiming to mimic regular users’ behavior, and
rely on their large and well-connected network structure to dissem-
inate the target likes while keeping a small count of likes per user.
For the latter, we also observed a high number of friends per profile
and a “reasonable” number of likes.
A month after the campaigns, we checked whether or not lik-
ers’ accounts were still active: as shown in Table 1, only one ac-
count associated with BoostLikes was terminated, as opposed to 9,
20, and 44 for the other like farms. 11 accounts from the regular
Facebook campaigns were also terminated. Although occurring not
so frequently, the accounts’ termination might be indicative of the
disposable nature of fake accounts on most like farms, where “bot-
like" patterns are actually easy to detect. It also mirrors the chal-
lenge Facebook is confronted by, with like farms such as Boost-
Likes that exhibit patterns closely resembling real users’ behavior,
thus making fake like detection quite difficult.
We stress that our findings do not necessarily imply that adver-
tising on Facebook is ineffective, since our campaigns were specif-
ically designed to avert real users. However, our work provides
strong evidence that likers attracted on our honeypot pages, even
when using legitimate Facebook campaigns, are significantly dif-
ferent from typical Facebook users, which confirms the concerns
about the genuineness of these likes. We also show that most fake
likes exhibit some peculiar characteristics – including demograph-
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of likes by users in Facebook and like farm campaigns.
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Figure 5: Jaccard index similarity (×100) matrices of page likes and likers across different campaigns
ics, likes, temporal and social graph patterns – that can and should
be exploited by like fraud detection algorithms.
Besides the design of detection techniques, items for future work
include larger and more diverse honeypots measurements as well
as longer observation of removed likes. Also, as suggested in prior
work [4], fake likes might be generated via fake accounts, malware,
malicious browser extensions, and social engineering, thus prompt-
ing the need for further investigation of fake likes’ origin.
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